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NOTE BY THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT**REPORT OF THE OPCW TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE VISIT ON THE ACTIVITIES
CARRIED OUT IN SUPPORT OF A REQUEST BY UKRAINE
(TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE VISIT TAV/04/24)**

1. The OPCW Technical Secretariat (the Secretariat) received a request from Ukraine for technical assistance under subparagraph 38(e) of Article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention (the Convention), in relation to samples that it had in its custody as well as documentation and evidence related to their collection. Ukraine reported to the Secretariat that these samples had been collected following an incident involving a toxic chemical, on 20 September 2024, on positions of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine near the village of Illinka, in the Dnipropetrovsk region.
2. Under the same subparagraph of Article VIII of the Convention, Ukraine requested the Secretariat to visit Ukraine and receive the above-mentioned documentation and evidence, to interview witnesses, and to provide a technical evaluation. The Director-General dispatched an OPCW technical assistance visit (TAV) team (TAV team) to provide the requested assistance to Ukraine.
3. The TAV team deployed to Ukraine and collected related documentation and digital files as well as testimonies from first-hand witnesses, and also received three samples collected by Ukraine: one shell of grenade and two soil samples collected from a trench.
4. After the deployment, the OPCW Laboratory received the samples from the TAV team, and unpacked and prepared them for off-site analysis by two OPCW designated laboratories selected by the Director-General. This activity was carried out in strict compliance with OPCW procedures.
5. The TAV team analysed all of the supporting material handed over by the Ukrainian authorities and assessed that the procedures followed by the Ukrainian experts were in line with international standards related to sample collection, preservation, and transportation, as followed by the Secretariat when maintaining the chain of custody.
6. Digital photos and videos in possession of the Secretariat contain metadata that serves to identify with certainty the date, time, equipment, and location of their creation. The TAV team verified the authenticity of the digital files it had received. It assessed that the information contained in the documentation and records provided by Ukraine was consistent with the content of the digital files with regard to the date, time, equipment, and location. The TAV team was able to confirm that the chain of custody of the digital files had been maintained.



7. Taken together, the documentation and evidence handed over by Ukraine to the TAV team during the visit, the content of the digital files provided, as well as the information collected and the narrative described by first-hand witnesses, enabled the TAV team to corroborate that, as reported by Ukraine to the OPCW TAV team, the chain of custody of the three samples collected from a trench in Ukraine located along the confrontation lines with the opposing troops, had been maintained.
8. The results of the analyses of these samples conducted by two OPCW designated laboratories, separately and independently from one another, indicate that both the grenade collected from the trench and the soil sample collected from the dark splatter next to it contained the riot control agent 2-Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile, known as CS.
9. Upon receipt of the TAV report on 18 November 2024, the Permanent Representation of Ukraine to the OPCW on the same day requested the Secretariat to declassify and share the full report (annexed hereto) with all States Parties to the Convention and to publish it on the OPCW official website.

Annex: Report of the OPCW Technical Assistance Visit on the Activities Carried out in Support of a Request by Ukraine (Technical Assistance Visit TAV/04/24)

Annex**REPORT OF THE OPCW TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE VISIT
ON THE ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT IN SUPPORT OF A REQUEST BY
UKRAINE (TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE VISIT TAV/04/24)**

This document contains the report of the technical assistance visit conducted by the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons upon a request by Ukraine pursuant to subparagraph 38(e) of Article VIII of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction

1. Ukraine requested technical assistance from the OPCW Technical Secretariat (the Secretariat) under subparagraph 38(e) of Article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention (the Convention) in relation to samples that it had in its custody as well as documentation and evidence related to their collection. Ukraine reported to the Secretariat that these samples were collected following an incident of “use of a chemical riot control agent ... during hostilities against the Ukrainian Defence Forces”, on 20 September 2024, on positions of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine near the village of Illinka, Nikopolskyi district, in the Dnipropetrovsk region. Under the same subparagraph of Article VIII of the Convention, Ukraine requested the Secretariat to visit Ukraine and receive the above-mentioned documentation and evidence, to interview witnesses, and to provide a technical evaluation, including for scheduled and unscheduled chemicals, through OPCW designated laboratories. The Director-General dispatched an OPCW technical assistance visit team (TAV team) to provide the requested assistance to Ukraine. A mandate was issued by the Director-General to guide the activities of the TAV team.
2. Upon arrival in Ukraine, the TAV team conducted a first meeting on the first day of the deployment with the Ukrainian authorities and agreed on the plan of the visit. This plan included the handover of samples, the receipt of related documentation and digital files, and the collection of testimonies from first-hand witnesses.
3. On the same day, following the initial meeting, the TAV team received three environmental samples from the Ukrainian authorities. These samples consisted of two soil samples and one item referred to by the Ukrainian authorities as “an object similar to a hand aerosol (chemical) grenade”. A description and additional information about the samples received are provided further in this report.
4. The TAV team packed the samples in line with the relevant Secretariat procedures, including for maintaining the chain of custody, and ensured that the handling of the samples was kept to the minimum. This was achieved first through the verification of the integrity of each sample in its original packaging, with the seals that had been applied by the Ukrainian team when the samples were collected in the field. Subsequently, the TAV team overpacked and sealed each sample, and prepared and arranged for their transportation and shipment to the OPCW Laboratory for preparation for off-site analysis by OPCW designated laboratories.


5. Following the handover and packaging of the samples, the TAV team received documentation and information about the sampling process conducted by the relevant Ukrainian services, and collected copies of supporting documents, photographs, and video recordings of the process.
6. The TAV team also received physical evidence, both in Ukrainian and in official English translation, as well as photographs, and video recordings of activities carried out by the relevant Ukrainian services. This included interviewing the military personnel who witnessed the reported incident.
7. The TAV team examined the metadata of the digital files it had received. Digital photos and videos contain data that serves to identify with certainty the date, time, equipment, and location of their creation. The TAV team verified the authenticity of such metadata and assessed that the information contained in the documentation and records provided by Ukraine was consistent with the content of the digital files with regard to date, time, equipment, and location. The TAV team was able to confirm that the chain of custody of the digital files had been maintained.
8. The following is a summary of the information handed over by the Ukrainian authorities to the OPCW TAV team:
 - (a) On 20 September 2024, at 16:38 local time, the Head of a military unit of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, who was positioned with other members of the unit at the observation post, gave the order to check an object that they had heard hitting the ground in the trench. Ten minutes later, the information was reported to the Head of the Department of Technical Means of the military unit about an “object similar to a grenade marked RG-Vo”. Subsequently, the information about “the object” was relayed through the chain of command and, shortly after 17:00 local time on the same day, reached the Head of CBRN Service of the 8th Border Detachment in Zaporizhzhia City.
 - (b) On 21 September 2024, at 08:32, the latter further relayed the received information through the chain of command of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) Counterintelligence Department and the Department of Pre-Trial Investigation of the SSU Main Investigation Department. At 10:23 on the same day, subsequent to the order by the 1st Deputy Head of the SSU Main Investigation Department, an investigative team was formed and instructed to inspect the scene where the object had fallen and to collect it.
 - (c) On 22 September 2024, the investigative team dispatched to Illinka village in Nikopolskyi district, in the Dnipropetrovsk region, to inspect the location where the object had been seen. The inspection of the scene was carried out from 11:54 to 12:36 (local time). In addition to video recordings of the sampling process at the location of the “object”, an “incident scene report” was produced. It included a description of sampling activities and the chain of custody for the samples and the digital files.
 - (d) On 22 September 2024, the investigative team conducted five interviews with five members of the above-mentioned military unit, who had been present at their observation post when the reported incident took place. The members of

the unit described their position, which consisted of two dugouts and one trench line located near Illinka village. Three of them manned the first dugout, while the two other members were positioned at the second. They had been tasked to survey the area and the airspace with the help of technical means, and to prevent the landing of opposing troops.

- (e) The five witnesses indicated that, on 20 September 2024, they heard an approaching drone. A few minutes later, they heard the sound of an “object” that fell on the ground. One of the soldiers checked the location approximately 10 minutes after the reported incident and reported to the Head of the observation post that a silver-coloured object similar to a grenade had fallen on the ground in the trench. The soldier smelled a pungent odour when approaching the location of the object, started experiencing excessive salivation, and immediately left the trench. The soldier experienced tearing for approximately 5 minutes, and nasal congestion for about 20 minutes. When back to the shelter, the soldier’s colleagues mentioned that they could smell the pungent odour on him. After informing the Head of their unit about the fallen object, the witnesses mentioned that they had been instructed not to approach or touch the object or its surroundings before the arrival of the investigation team.
- 9. The TAV team analysed all the supporting material handed over by the Ukrainian authorities and assessed that the procedures followed by the Ukrainian experts were in line with international standards related to sample collection, as followed by the Secretariat when maintaining the chain of custody.
- 10. On the second day of the deployment, the TAV team conducted four interviews with individuals who were either witnesses of the reported incident, or who were involved in the chain of command or as experts in the collection of the samples in the field. The interviews were conducted in accordance with the procedures set out in the OPCW work instructions. Only the witness, the TAV team members, and one interpreter were present during the interview to guarantee the independence and impartiality of the interview process.
- 11. Witnesses reported to the TAV team that the military positions near Illinka village, just like other positions in the region, were subject to continuous shelling by artillery and other launching systems. Witnesses stated that opposing troops were located approximately 8 km away from their positions, on the other side of a dry river (Figure 1 below). One witness stated that reconnaissance, surveillance, and attack drones were often heard and intercepted by the Ukrainian military units.
- 12. Another witness mentioned having informed the Head of the unit about hearing a drone approaching, and a few minutes later, heard the sound of something hitting the bottom of a trench, in the proximity of the dugout where the witness had been taking shelter. The same witness stated that he was instructed by the Head of the unit to inspect what had been dropped. The witness went to the trench and saw a grenade with markings that was lying on the ground in the trench. Although checked from a distance, the witness said that he smelled a pungent, irritating smell and started experiencing symptoms of tearing and excessive salivation and left the trench immediately.

13. Through witnesses' accounts, the TAV team collected information regarding the chain of command in relation to instructions given following the reported incident. The TAV team was able to visualise the transfer and exchange of messages regarding the mentioned grenade through communication platforms on witnesses' mobile phones. The TAV team video-recorded these messages and verified the date and time thereof. This information was also verified in comparison with the information enclosed in the chain-of-command's document provided by the relevant Ukrainian authorities.

FIGURE 1: MAP¹ SHOWING THE AREA OF THE REPORTED INCIDENT (IN THE DARK BLUE RECTANGLE) IN UKRAINE AND THE AREAS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE OPPOSING SIDE (IN RED) ON 20 SEPTEMBER 2024



14. In addition, one of the witnesses provided the TAV team with additional details regarding the sampling process conducted by the Ukrainian SSU experts. The witness stated that, shortly after collecting the samples and while carrying out the packaging, they felt burning sensations on their faces together with itchiness that lasted for some time after they had left the field. The witness added that they were not sure whether what they felt was related to the handling of the samples or any other sources, such as sweating.
15. On the third day of the deployment, the TAV team packed its equipment and all of the material it had received and collected in Ukraine during the visit and returned to OPCW Headquarters.

¹

<https://liveuamap.com/en/time/20.09.2024>.


16. Overall, the documentation and the evidence handed over to the TAV team during the visit, the content of the digital files provided, as well as the information collected and the narrative described by first-hand witnesses, enabled the TAV team to corroborate that, as reported by Ukraine to the TAV team, the chain of custody of the three samples collected from a trench in Ukraine, located along the confrontation lines with the opposing troops, had been maintained.
17. After the deployment, the OPCW Laboratory received the samples from the TAV team and unpacked and prepared them for off-site analysis by OPCW designated laboratories selected by the Director-General. This activity was carried out following OPCW procedures and in the presence of observers from the Ukrainian Permanent Representation to the Organisation.
18. Based on the information and video recordings received by the TAV team, the samples consisted of:
 - (a) one exploded grenade collected from the bottom of a trench next to two dugouts (sample code SDS03) (Figure 2 below);
 - (b) one soil sample collected from a dark splatter close to the grenade (sample code SLS02) (Figure 2-B and 2-C); and
 - (c) one soil sample collected approximately 10 metres away from the collected grenade on the left side of the same trench. This soil was collected as a control sample from one side of the trench, about 150 cm above the ground (sample code SLS01) (Figure 2-D).

FIGURE 2: SNAPSHOTS FROM VIDEO RECORDINGS DURING THE COLLECTION OF SAMPLES IN THE FIELD. A: THE GRENADE ON THE GROUND IN THE TRENCH; B: A DARK SPLATTER NEXT TO THE GRENADE; C: VISIBLE MARKINGS ON THE GRENADE; D: LOCATION OF COLLECTION OF THE CONTROL SOIL SAMPLE



19. At the OPCW Laboratory, each of the soil samples was homogenised and split into equal portions. The grenade's content was extracted with two different solvents (dichloromethane and acetonitrile) and the extracts were then split into equal portions.
20. Two sets of the generated sample splits were subsequently dispatched for analysis by two OPCW designated laboratories, selected by the Director-General, and separately and independently from one another.
21. The scope of analysis covers the identification of scheduled chemicals under the Convention, their precursors and degradation products, and non-scheduled chemicals relevant to explosives and riot control agents. Relevant chemicals which are confidently identified at low concentrations (less than one part per million) are also to be reported.
22. The collected grenade is a silver-coloured metallic cylindrical canister, approximately 10 centimetres long with a diameter of 5 centimetres. On its curved face, the grenade shows visible black markings on two lines: on the top line, markings in Cyrillic, "ПГ-Bo" (which is translated to "RG-Vo" in English); and on the bottom line, the following numbers: "862-2-24" (Figure 3-A below).

FIGURE 3: PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE COLLECTED GRENADE. A: GRENADE FRONT WITH MARKINGS; B: TOP SIDE OF THE GRENADE; C: SIDE VIEW OF THE TOP OF THE GRENADE; D: PHOTOGRAPH SHOWING THE CONVEX BOTTOM OF THE GRENADE



23. The top circular face of the grenade consists of a green lid with a central, rusty metallic cylindrical shape, with a diameter of about one cm, which has a side orifice and is part of the fuse system of the grenade. The green lid shows an agglomeration of a black solid substance on its surface alongside a half O-ring-shaped opening. Traces of rust are also observed around this opening (Figure 3-B and 3-C). This opening served as the access point when the solvent extracts were prepared by the OPCW Laboratory.
24. Several scratches are observed on the outer curved face of the grenade. The bottom face of the canister is slightly convex, which makes it impossible to stand straight on a flat surface (Figure 3-A and 3-D).
25. The TAV team prioritised the chemical analysis of the grenade content and did not perform a non-destructive evaluation of the item. Therefore, at this stage, the TAV team cannot provide a thorough description of the inner components of the grenade and of its fuse system.
26. The TAV team noted that, during the preparation of solvent extracts from inside the grenade, a dark solid substance was observed, which prevented reaching the bottom of the canister from inside when using a stainless steel spatula.

27. As instructed by the Director-General, the TAV team was able to:
- (a) receive samples in the possession of the Ukrainian authorities according to the requirements of the relevant procedures followed by the OPCW;
 - (b) examine and collect copies of relevant documents and records;
 - (c) collect testimonies from relevant persons;
 - (d) collect video recordings and examine the transfer of relevant information from telephone correspondence;
 - (e) ensure maintenance of the chain of custody for all material received and gathered; and
 - (f) assess and analyse the information received and collected during the visit.
28. The results of the analysis conducted by the two OPCW designated laboratories of the three samples are the following:
- (a) both OPCW designated laboratories reported the presence of 2-Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile, a riot control agent known as CS, in sample SLS02 (the soil sample collected from the dark splatter next to the grenade), and in sample SDS03 (solvent extracts from the grenade). CS-related compounds (isomers, degradation products or precursors) were also identified in the two mentioned samples; and
 - (b) in addition, one of the designated laboratories was able to report the presence of 2-Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS) in sample SLS01 (the soil collected approximately 10 metres away from the grenade) at a very low concentration level.
29. The results of the analysis of these samples conducted by two OPCW designated laboratories, separately and independently from one another, indicate that both the grenade collected from the trench and the soil sample collected from the dark splatter next to it contained the riot control agent CS.

Appendices:

Appendix 1: Documents and Digital Materials Handed over by the Ukrainian Authorities

Appendix 2: Information Generated by the Technical Assistance Visit Team

Appendix 1

DOCUMENTS AND DIGITAL MATERIALS HANDED OVER BY THE UKRAINIAN AUTHORITIES

The tables below summarise the list of physical evidence collected from the National Authority of Ukraine.

TABLE A1.1: DOCUMENTS RECEIVED FROM THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY OF UKRAINE

Entry Number	Assigned Code		
1	U001		
01	Protocol	Accident scene report, Ukrainian	4 pages
02	Protocol	Accident scene report, English	5 pages
03	Transcript	Video files S3190001 and S3190002	18 pages
04	Transcript	Video files GH010120, GH020120, and GH030120	13 pages
05	Transcript	Video files GH010052, 005202, 005203, 005204, and 00520052	11 pages
06	Chain of Custody for Sample	Sample Info 01, Ukrainian	2 pages
07	Chain of Custody for Sample	Sample Info 01, English	2 pages
08	Chain of Custody for Sample	Sample Info 02, Ukrainian	2 pages
09	Chain of Custody for Sample	Sample Info 02, English	2 pages
10	Chain of Custody for Sample	Sample Info 03, Ukrainian	2 pages
11	Chain of Custody for Sample	Sample Info 03, English	2 pages
12	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 01, Ukrainian	1 page
13	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 01, English	1 page
14	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 02, Ukrainian	1 page
15	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 02, English	1 page
16	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 03, Ukrainian	1 page
17	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 03, English	1 page
18	Hash Values	SD-card 01, H00001, Ukrainian	2 pages
19	Hash Values	SD-card 01, H00001, English	2 pages
20	Hash Values	SD-card 02, H00002, Ukrainian	2 pages
21	Hash Values	SD-card 02, H00002, English	2 pages
22	Hash Values	SD-card 03, H00003, Ukrainian	2 pages
23	Hash Values	SD-card 03, H00003, English	2 pages

Entry Number	Assigned Code		
24	Chain of Custody for digital information	Protocol on processing video files, Ukrainian	4 pages
25	Chain of Custody for digital information	Report on processing video files, English	5 pages
26	Transcript	Video files S3260001, S3260002, and S3260003	6 pages
27	Interview Protocol	Report witness 1, Ukrainian	5 pages
28	Interview Protocol	Report witness 1, English	4 pages
29	Interview Transcript	Transcript Witness 1, video file S3230001	6 pages
30	Interview Protocol	Report witness 2, Ukrainian	5 pages
31	Interview Protocol	Report witness 2, English	4 pages
32	Interview Transcript	Transcript Witness 2, video file S3220001	5 pages
33	Interview Protocol	Report witness 3, Ukrainian	5 pages
34	Interview Protocol	Report witness 3, English	4 pages
35	Interview Transcript	Transcript Witness 3, video file S3210001	9 pages
36	Interview Protocol	Report witness 4, Ukrainian	5 pages
37	Interview Protocol	Report witness 4, English	4 pages
38	Interview Transcript	Transcript Witness 4, video file S3200001	12 pages
39	Interview Protocol	Report witness 5, Ukrainian	5 pages
40	Interview Protocol	Report witness 5, English	4 pages
41	Interview Transcript	Transcript Witness 5, video file S3220001	4 pages
42	Letter	Answer from the Central Research Institute, Ukrainian	1 page
43	Letter	Answer from the Central Research Institute, English	1 page
44	Diploma	Interpreter 1	1 page
45	Diploma	Interpreter 2	1 page
46	Letter	Cover letter and chain of information transfer, Ukrainian	3 pages
47	Letter	Cover letter and chain of information transfer, English	3 pages
48	Request for information	Request for information and attachment, Ukrainian	8 pages
49	Request for information	Request for information, English	1 page

TABLE A1.2: ELECTRONIC DATA RECEIVED FROM THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY OF UKRAINE

Entry Number	Assigned Code		
2	U001		
hash.csv	gh030120.mp4	* leinfo.sav	s3240001.mp4
* indexervolume guid	gh030120.thm	* get_started_with_gopro.url	* backup.hst
* wpsettings.dat	gl010120.lrv	* mdb9.db	* backup.tmp
s2510023.jpg	gl020120.lrv	* card	* backupam.hst
s2510024.jpg	gl030120.lrv	* version.txt	* index.dat
s3190001.mp4	* leinfo.sav	s3260001.mp4	s3230001.mp4
s3190002.mp4	* get_started_with_gopro.url	s3260002.mp4	* backup.hst
* backup.hst	* mdb9.db	s3260003.mp4	* backup.tmp
* backup.tmp	* card	* backup.hst	* backupam.hst
* backupam.hst	* version.txt	* backup.tmp	* index.dat
* index.dat	gh010052.mp4	* backupam.hst	s3210001.mp4
* thumb.tdt	gh010052.thm	* index.dat	* backup.hst
* thumb.tid	gh020052.mp4	s3200001.mp4	* backup.tmp
* index.bdm	gh020052.thm	* backup.hst	* backupam.hst
* movieobj.bdm	gh030052.mp4	* backup.tmp	* index.dat
* backup.cpi	gh030052.thm	* backupam.hst	* thumb.tdt
* bak-s00.pdi	gh040052.mp4	* index.dat	* thumb.tid
* bak-s01.pdi	gh040052.thm	s3220001.mp4	* index.bdm
gh010120.mp4	gl010052.lrv	* backup.hst	* movieobj.bdm
gh010120.thm	gl020052.lrv	* backup.tmp	* backup.cpi
gh020120.mp4	gl030052.lrv	* backupam.hst	* bak-s00.pdi
gh020120.thm	gl040052.lrv	* index.dat	* bak-s01.pdi

* Files marked with an asterisk (*) represent system files of the recording device(s).

Appendix 2**INFORMATION GENERATED BY THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE VISIT TEAM**

The tables below summarise the electronic files generated by the TAV team during meetings and sample handling.

TABLE A2.1: RECORDINGS TAKEN BY THE TAV TEAM DURING MEETINGS AND SAMPLE HANDOVER

Entry Number	Assigned Code		
1	U001		
DR0000_0085.wav	DRA0000_0086.wav	00000.mts	00001.mts

TABLE A2.2: PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY THE TAV TEAM DURING SAMPLE HANDOVER FROM THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY OF UKRAINE

Entry Number	Assigned Code			
2	U001			
DSCN0121.jpg	DSCN0150.jpg	DSCN0179.jpg	DSCN0208.jpg	DSCN0237.jpg
DSCN0122.jpg	DSCN0151.jpg	DSCN0180.jpg	DSCN0209.jpg	DSCN0238.jpg
DSCN0123.jpg	DSCN0152.jpg	DSCN0181.jpg	DSCN0210.jpg	DSCN0239.jpg
DSCN0124.jpg	DSCN0153.jpg	DSCN0182.jpg	DSCN0211.jpg	DSCN0240.jpg
DSCN0125.jpg	DSCN0154.jpg	DSCN0183.jpg	DSCN0212.jpg	DSCN0241.jpg
DSCN0126.jpg	DSCN0155.jpg	DSCN0184.jpg	DSCN0213.jpg	DSCN0242.jpg
DSCN0127.jpg	DSCN0156.jpg	DSCN0185.jpg	DSCN0214.jpg	DSCN0243.jpg
DSCN0128.jpg	DSCN0157.jpg	DSCN0186.jpg	DSCN0215.jpg	DSCN0244.jpg
DSCN0129.jpg	DSCN0158.jpg	DSCN0187.jpg	DSCN0216.jpg	DSCN0245.jpg
DSCN0130.jpg	DSCN0159.jpg	DSCN0188.jpg	DSCN0217.jpg	DSCN0246.jpg
DSCN0131.jpg	DSCN0160.jpg	DSCN0189.jpg	DSCN0218.jpg	DSCN0247.jpg
DSCN0132.jpg	DSCN0161.jpg	DSCN0190.jpg	DSCN0219.jpg	DSCN0248.jpg
DSCN0133.jpg	DSCN0162.jpg	DSCN0191.jpg	DSCN0220.jpg	DSCN0249.jpg
DSCN0134.jpg	DSCN0163.jpg	DSCN0192.jpg	DSCN0221.jpg	DSCN0250.jpg
DSCN0135.jpg	DSCN0164.jpg	DSCN0193.jpg	DSCN0222.jpg	DSCN0251.jpg
DSCN0136.jpg	DSCN0165.jpg	DSCN0194.jpg	DSCN0223.jpg	DSCN0252.jpg
DSCN0137.jpg	DSCN0166.jpg	DSCN0195.jpg	DSCN0224.jpg	DSCN0253.jpg
DSCN0138.jpg	DSCN0167.jpg	DSCN0196.jpg	DSCN0225.jpg	DSCN0254.jpg
DSCN0139.jpg	DSCN0168.jpg	DSCN0197.jpg	DSCN0226.jpg	DSCN0255.jpg
DSCN0140.jpg	DSCN0169.jpg	DSCN0198.jpg	DSCN0227.jpg	DSCN0256.jpg
DSCN0141.jpg	DSCN0170.jpg	DSCN0199.jpg	DSCN0228.jpg	DSCN0257.jpg
DSCN0142.jpg	DSCN0171.jpg	DSCN0200.jpg	DSCN0229.jpg	DSCN0258.jpg
DSCN0143.jpg	DSCN0172.jpg	DSCN0201.jpg	DSCN0230.jpg	DSCN0259.jpg
DSCN0144.jpg	DSCN0173.jpg	DSCN0202.jpg	DSCN0231.jpg	DSCN0260.jpg
DSCN0145.jpg	DSCN0174.jpg	DSCN0203.jpg	DSCN0232.jpg	DSCN0261.jpg
DSCN0146.jpg	DSCN0175.jpg	DSCN0204.jpg	DSCN0233.jpg	DSCN0262.jpg

Entry Number	Assigned Code			
DSCN0147.jpg	DSCN0176.jpg	DSCN0205.jpg	DSCN0234.jpg	DSCN0263.jpg
DSCN0148.jpg	DSCN0177.jpg	DSCN0206.jpg	DSCN0235.jpg	
DSCN0149.jpg	DSCN0178.jpg	DSCN0207.jpg	DSCN0236.jpg	

TABLE A2.3: PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY THE TAV TEAM DURING SAMPLE SPLITTING AT THE OPCW LABORATORY

Entry Number	Assigned Code			
3	U001			
DSCN0264.jpg	DSCN0294.jpg	DSCN0324.jpg	DSCN0354.jpg	DSCN0384.jpg
DSCN0265.jpg	DSCN0295.jpg	DSCN0325.jpg	DSCN0355.jpg	DSCN0385.jpg
DSCN0266.jpg	DSCN0296.jpg	DSCN0326.jpg	DSCN0356.jpg	DSCN0386.jpg
DSCN0267.jpg	DSCN0297.jpg	DSCN0327.jpg	DSCN0357.jpg	DSCN0387.jpg
DSCN0268.jpg	DSCN0298.jpg	DSCN0328.jpg	DSCN0358.jpg	DSCN0388.jpg
DSCN0269.jpg	DSCN0299.jpg	DSCN0329.jpg	DSCN0359.jpg	DSCN0389.jpg
DSCN0270.jpg	DSCN0300.jpg	DSCN0330.jpg	DSCN0360.jpg	DSCN0390.jpg
DSCN0271.jpg	DSCN0301.jpg	DSCN0331.jpg	DSCN0361.jpg	DSCN0391.jpg
DSCN0272.jpg	DSCN0302.jpg	DSCN0332.jpg	DSCN0362.jpg	DSCN0392.jpg
DSCN0273.jpg	DSCN0303.jpg	DSCN0333.jpg	DSCN0363.jpg	DSCN0393.jpg
DSCN0274.jpg	DSCN0304.jpg	DSCN0334.jpg	DSCN0364.jpg	DSCN0394.jpg
DSCN0275.jpg	DSCN0305.jpg	DSCN0335.jpg	DSCN0365.jpg	DSCN0395.jpg
DSCN0276.jpg	DSCN0306.jpg	DSCN0336.jpg	DSCN0366.jpg	DSCN0396.jpg
DSCN0277.jpg	DSCN0307.jpg	DSCN0337.jpg	DSCN0367.jpg	DSCN0397.jpg
DSCN0278.jpg	DSCN0308.jpg	DSCN0338.jpg	DSCN0368.jpg	DSCN0398.jpg
DSCN0279.jpg	DSCN0309.jpg	DSCN0339.jpg	DSCN0369.jpg	DSCN0399.jpg
DSCN0280.jpg	DSCN0310.jpg	DSCN0340.jpg	DSCN0370.jpg	DSCN0400.jpg
DSCN0281.jpg	DSCN0311.jpg	DSCN0341.jpg	DSCN0371.jpg	DSCN0401.jpg
DSCN0282.jpg	DSCN0312.jpg	DSCN0342.jpg	DSCN0372.jpg	DSCN0402.jpg
DSCN0283.jpg	DSCN0313.jpg	DSCN0343.jpg	DSCN0373.jpg	DSCN0403.jpg
DSCN0284.jpg	DSCN0314.jpg	DSCN0344.jpg	DSCN0374.jpg	DSCN0404.jpg
DSCN0285.jpg	DSCN0315.jpg	DSCN0345.jpg	DSCN0375.jpg	DSCN0405.jpg
DSCN0286.jpg	DSCN0316.jpg	DSCN0346.jpg	DSCN0376.jpg	DSCN0406.jpg
DSCN0287.jpg	DSCN0317.jpg	DSCN0347.jpg	DSCN0377.jpg	DSCN0407.jpg
DSCN0288.jpg	DSCN0318.jpg	DSCN0348.jpg	DSCN0378.jpg	DSCN0408.jpg
DSCN0289.jpg	DSCN0319.jpg	DSCN0349.jpg	DSCN0379.jpg	DSCN0409.jpg
DSCN0290.jpg	DSCN0320.jpg	DSCN0350.jpg	DSCN0380.jpg	DSCN0410.jpg
DSCN0291.jpg	DSCN0321.jpg	DSCN0351.jpg	DSCN0381.jpg	DSCN0411.jpg
DSCN0292.jpg	DSCN0322.jpg	DSCN0352.jpg	DSCN0382.jpg	DSCN0412.jpg
DSCN0293.jpg	DSCN0323.jpg	DSCN0353.jpg	DSCN0383.jpg	

TABLE A2.4: RECORDINGS TAKEN BY THE TAV TEAM DURING INTERVIEWS

Entry Number		Assigned Code		
4		U002		
DR0000_0087.wav	DR0000_0088.wav	00000.mts	00001.mts	00002.mts
Entry Number		Assigned Code		
5		U003		
DR0000_0091.wav		00000.mts		00001.mts
Entry Number		Assigned Code		
6		U004		
DR0000_0090.wav		00000.mts		00001.mts
Entry Number		Assigned Code		
7		U005		
DR0000_0089.wav		00000.mts		00001.mts